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INTRODUCTION 
The Chinese call it Nan Hai, the Malaysians call it Laut Cina 
Selatan, the Filipinos call it Dagat Kanlurang Pilipinas, and the 
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Vietnamese call it Biển Đông. Despite the many names it has been 
given, the South China Sea has come to be known primarily for the 
raging maritime disputes that have marred the surrounding nation states 
that each lay claim to part, if not all, of its waters. 
The South China Sea is a critical commercial gateway for a 
significant portion of the world’s merchant shipping and is an 
important economic and strategic region of the Indo-Pacific. This 
“semi-enclosed sea in the western Pacific Ocean, spanning an area of 
almost 3.5 million square kilometers,” is home to many islands and 
reefs, most notably The Paracels and Spratlys.1 These chains of small 
islands and coral reefs are important because control of the islands and 
reefs means control of the sea’s fisheries and oil and natural gas 
deposits. 
The fundamental dispute in the South China Sea concerns 
sovereignty over these off-shore islands and reefs. China, Brunei 
Darussalam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam claim to control 
some or all of the Spratly Islands.2 China and the Philippines claim the 
islands in Scarborough Shoal, and China and Vietnam claim the Paracel 
Islands.3 In addition, Taiwan claims the same islands as China. China’s 
nine-dash line, a vague historical depiction by China of its claim 
(encompassing about ninety percent of the South China Sea4), is the 
origin of numerous conflicting territorial claims in the region. Since 
around 2009, China “steadily increased its efforts to consolidate its 
position in the South China Sea under this claim with varied tactics, 
including using its military, coast guard, and maritime militia to harass 
foreign ships; exploring and extracting resources in disputed areas; and, 
starting in 2013, constructing artificial islands and basing military and 
civilian assets there.”5 
  
 
1 In re Republic of the Phil. v. China, PCA Case No. 2013-19, Certified Award, ¶ 3 (July 
12, 2016), https://pcacases.com/web/view/7 [hereinafter Award]. 
2 Why is the South China Sea Contentious?, BBC NEWS (July 12, 2016), http://www 
.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349. 
3 Id. 
4 David Lague, Analysis: China’s Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea, REUTERS 
(May 25, 2012, 9:13 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-sea-boundary-idUSB 
RE84O07520120525. 
5 Caitlin Campbell & Nargiza Salidjanova, South China Sea Arbitration Ruling: What 
Happened and What’s Next?, U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW 
COMMISSION 1 (July 12, 2016), http://www.uscc.gov/Research/south-china-sea-arbitra tion-
ruling-what-happened-and-what%E2%80%99s-next. 
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Source: Joining the Dashes, ECONOMIST (Oct. 4, 2014), http://www.econo 
mist.com/news/asia/21621844-south-china-seas-littoral-states-will-fight-
museums-archives-and. 
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS)6 established an international legal framework to govern all 
uses of the oceans. All of the states bordering the South China Sea—
Brunei Darussalam, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Vietnam—are parties to UNCLOS.7 Taiwan, which also borders the 
South China Sea, took steps to bring its legislation into conformity with 
UNCLOS.8 Therefore, UNCLOS is critically important when 
analyzing the legal disputes in the South China Sea. 
This summary begins by discussing how, under UNCLOS, territorial 
sovereignty is established and what water rights attach to islands and 
coastal states in order to provide the reader with the background 
necessary to understand the competing claims advanced by the 
Philippines and China. After introducing the Philippines’ and China’s 
claims that led to the initiation of arbitral proceedings, this summary 
examines the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s July 2016 Award (the 
 
6 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/./convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
7 The dates of ratification of the five claimant states are as follows: Brunei Darussalam, 
November 5, 1996; China, June 7, 1996; Malaysia, October 14, 1996; the Philippines, May 
8, 1984; and Vietnam, July 25, 1994. See United Nations Treaties Collection, Status of 
Treaties, UNITED NATIONS (Nov. 24, 2017), https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII 
.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en. 
8 See Yann-Huei Song & Zou Keyuan, Maritime Legislation of Mainland China and 
Taiwan: Developments, Comparison, Implications, and Potential Challenges for the United 
States, 31 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 303, 310−12 (2000). 
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Award). This summary outlines all fifteen of the Philippines’ final 
submissions, the Tribunal’s findings on jurisdiction, and the Tribunal’s 
analysis and conclusions on the Philippines’ submissions. In light of 
the Award, this summary also discusses China’s recent efforts, and lack 
thereof, to become compliant with the Award. Additionally, this 
summary presents the regional and international implications of the 
Award. 
I 
UNCLOS: TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RIGHTS TO 
SURROUNDING WATERS 
 
 
 Source: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): The 
Interpretations, THE PAPER (Mar. 24, 2016), http://asiamaritime .net/the-
paper-united-nations-convention-on-the-law-of-the-sea-unclos-the-
interpretations. 
The principal dispute over sovereign control of the island chains, 
and the purpose of China’s nine-dash line, in the South China Sea is 
concentrated on the fact that UNCLOS grants certain rights and 
obligations attaching to ocean areas surrounding a state’s sovereign 
territory. Territorial sovereignty extends over land territory, the 
territorial sea surrounding that land, and the seabed of the territorial 
sea.9 Territorial sovereignty is the “right to exercise [within the 
territory], to the exclusion of any other [s]tate, the functions of a 
[s]tate.”10 Accompanying this right is the obligation to protect within 
 
9 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 105 (7th ed. 2008). 
10 Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 11 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). 
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this territory the rights of other states.11 Islands and rocks are both 
territory that become subject to state jurisdiction.12 In order for a state 
to establish sovereignty over waters, it is imperative that the state 
demonstrate that it has sovereignty over the land mass.13 If a state does 
not have territorial sovereignty over an island, then that state does not 
have rights to the surrounding waters. UNCLOS’s rights protecting the 
surrounding waters are often the reason states want to claim 
sovereignty over islands and land masses in the open waters. 
Unfortunately, UNCLOS does not outline how competing states 
determine which have a better sovereignty claim over a disputed 
territory, including off-shore islands; UNCLOS is limited in settling 
territory disputes to only defining the maritime zones that can be 
claimed once sovereignty over the land has been established.14 
The water surrounding a coastal state is divided into three zones: the 
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, and the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ).15 In addition to specific rights in these three zones, the state has 
rights to the continental shelf.16 
A. Territorial Sea 
According to UNCLOS, “[t]he sovereignty of a coastal [s]tate 
extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of 
an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, 
described as the territorial sea.”17 The territorial sea extends up to 
twelve nautical miles from the baseline.18 A state has the same rights 
in its territorial sea as it does in its land territory.19 Delineating the 
territorial sea was one of the main objectives of the third conference on 
 
11 BROWNLIE, supra note 9, at 105. 
12 Id. at 183. 
13 UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 2. 
14 ROBERT BECKMAN, ASIA SOC’Y / LKY SPP CONFERENCE, THE PHILIPPINES V. CHINA 
CASE AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES 2 (2013), https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/Beckman-Asia-Society-LKY-SPP-March-2013-draft-of-6-March 
.pdf. 
15 Section 1.3: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), GLOBAL 
CCS INSTITUTE, https://hub.globalccsinstitute.com/publications/offshore-co2-storage-legal 
-resources/united-nations-convention-law-sea-unclos (last visited Feb. 3, 2018). 
16 UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 77. 
17 Id. at art. 2. 
18 Id. at art. 3. 
19 Id. at art. 2. 
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the Law of the Sea.20 The sovereign state has the obligation to allow 
for the “innocent passage” of foreign ships within its territorial sea.21 
B. Contiguous Zone 
The contiguous zone is the water extending from the outer perimeter 
of the state’s territorial sea, and may extend up to twenty-four nautical 
miles from the baseline.22 A coastal state may take enforcement 
measures in a contiguous zone to prevent or punish “infringement of 
its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within 
its territory or territorial sea.”23 
C. Exclusive Economic Zone 
The EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea 
extending up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline.24 
In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has: 
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or 
non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the 
seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the 
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the 
production of energy from the water, currents and winds; 
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this 
Convention with regard to: 
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations 
and structures; 
(ii) marine scientific research; 
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.25 
D. Continental Shelf 
The continental shelf “comprises the seabed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea . . . to a distance 
of 200 nautical miles from the baseline.”26 The coastal state has the 
 
20 Div. for Ocean Affairs & the Law of the Sea, The United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective), U.N. (1998), http://www.un.org/depts/los 
/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm#ThirdConference. 
21 UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 17. 
22 Id. at art. 33. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at arts. 55, 57. 
25 Id. at art. 56. 
26 Id. at art. 76(1). Note: the continental shelf extends, at minimum, 200 nautical miles. 
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exclusive sovereign rights to explore and exploit the natural resources 
of the continental shelf.27 
When a state becomes a party to UNCLOS, it consents in advance 
to the dispute settlement provisions in Part XV of UNCLOS. The 
general principle in Part XV is that if a dispute arises between two 
parties on the interpretation or application of a provision in UNCLOS, 
and the dispute cannot be resolved by consultation and negotiation, 
either party to the dispute may unilaterally bring the dispute before an 
international court or arbitral tribunal.28 Part XV also provides that any 
resulting decision of the court or tribunal is legally binding on both 
parties to the dispute.29 
II 
INITIATION OF ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS 
On January 22, 2013, the Philippines initiated arbitration 
proceedings with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (the Tribunal) in 
The Hague, Netherlands, to clarify its conflicting claims with China in 
the South China Sea.30 The Philippines submitted an application for 
rulings in respect to four overarching matters concerning the 
relationship between the Philippines and China in the South China 
Sea.31 
First, the Philippines sought a ruling on the source of the parties’ 
rights and obligations in the South China Sea and the effect of 
UNCLOS on China’s claims to historic rights within its so-called nine-
dash line.32 
Second, the Philippines sought a ruling on whether certain maritime 
features claimed by both China and the Philippines are properly 
characterized as islands, rocks, low-tide elevations, or submerged 
banks under UNCLOS.33 The status of these maritime features under 
UNCLOS determines the maritime zones that the features are capable 
of generating.34 
 
27 Id. at arts. 77(1)–(2). 
28 Id. at art. 286. 
29 Id. at art. 296(1). 
30 Award, supra note 1, ¶ 28. 
31 Id. ¶ 4. 
32 Id. ¶ 7. 
33 Id. ¶ 8. 
34 Id.  
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Third, the Philippines sought rulings on whether certain Chinese 
actions in the South China Sea have violated UNCLOS by interfering 
with the exercise of the Philippines’ sovereign rights and freedoms 
under UNCLOS, or through construction and fishing activities that 
have harmed the marine environment.35 
Finally, the Philippines sought a ruling that certain actions taken by 
China––in particular its large-scale land reclamation and construction 
of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands since the arbitration was 
commenced––unlawfully aggravated and extended the parties’ 
dispute.36 
The Philippines’ claim recognized that the Tribunal does not have 
jurisdiction to decide two categories of legal issues. The Philippines 
admitted that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide which state has 
the better claim to sovereignty over the disputed islands.37 The 
Philippines also conceded that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over 
certain categories of disputes––these being disputes that are excluded 
from the compulsory dispute settlement procedures in UNCLOS 
because of China’s Declaration under Article 298 of UNCLOS.38 In its 
Statement of Claim, the Philippines expressly stated that it is conscious 
of China’s Declaration under Article 298 of UNCLOS excluding 
certain categories of disputes‒–including disputes on sea boundary 
delimitation and historic titles‒–from binding dispute settlement, and 
has avoided raising any subjects or making any claims of such.39 
Throughout the arbitration process, the Chinese government adhered 
to the position of neither accepting nor participating in the proceedings. 
The government reiterated that position in diplomatic notes; in the 
“Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China 
on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration 
Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines” dated December 7, 2014 
(“China’s Position Paper”); in letters to members of the Tribunal from 
the Chinese Ambassador to the Kingdom of the Netherlands; and in 
many public statements.40 The Chinese Government also made clear 
 
35 Id. ¶ 9. 
36 Id. ¶ 10. 
37 Id. ¶ 6. 
38 Gov’t of China, Declarations and Statements: China, U.N.: DIV. OF OCEAN AFFAIRS 
& THE LAW OF THE SEA (Aug. 25, 2006), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agree 
ments/convention_declarations.htm#. 
39 Award, supra note 1, ¶ 28. 
40 Id. ¶ 51. 
HEBERT (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2018  12:31 PM 
2018] The South China Sea Arbitration Award and Its  297 
Widespread Implications 
that these statements and documents “shall by no means be interpreted 
as China’s participation in the arbitral proceeding [in any form].”41 
III 
THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION’S AWARD 
Despite China’s steadfast decision to not participate, the Tribunal 
emphasized that China’s non-participation did not deprive the Tribunal 
of jurisdiction; its resulting award was overwhelmingly favorable to the 
Philippines’ position, ruling several elements of China’s claims in the 
South China Sea unlawful.42 The following sections address the 
specifics of the Philippines’ submissions, the Tribunal’s conclusion to 
these submissions, and some implications of the Tribunal’s decision in 
regards to the Philippines and China. 
A. Relief Requested by the Philippines 
During the proceedings, the Philippines made fifteen Final 
Submissions that provided more detail to supplement its four 
overarching claims (summarized in Section III). The Philippines 
requested the Tribunal to find that: 
(1) China’s maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, like those 
of the Philippines, may not extend beyond those expressly 
permitted by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea  . . . ; 
(2) China’s claims to sovereign rights jurisdiction, and to “historic 
rights,” with respect to the maritime areas of the South China 
Sea encompassed by the so-called “nine-dash line” are contrary 
to the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that 
they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China’s 
maritime entitlements expressly permitted by UNCLOS; 
(3) Scarborough Shoal generates no entitlement to an exclusive 
economic zone or continental shelf; 
(4) Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, and Subi Reef are low-
tide elevations that do not generate entitlement to a territorial 
sea, exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, and are not 
features that are capable of appropriation by occupation or 
otherwise; 
 
41 Id. 
42 Press Release, Permanent Court of Arbitration, The South China Sea Arbitration: The 
Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China, 6 (July 12, 2016), 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1801 [hereinafter Press Release]. 
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(5) Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are part of the 
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the 
Philippines; 
(6) Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef (including Hughes Reef) are 
low-tide elevations that do not generate entitlement to a 
territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, but 
their low-water line may be used to determine the baseline from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea of Namyit and Sin Cowe, 
respectively, is measured; 
(7) Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef generate no 
entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf; 
(8) China has unlawfully interfered with the enjoyment and exercise 
of the sovereign rights of the Philippines with respect to the 
living and non-living resources of its exclusive economic zone 
and continental shelf; 
(9) China has unlawfully failed to prevent its nationals and vessels 
from exploiting the living resources in the exclusive economic 
zone of the Philippines; 
(10) China has unlawfully prevented Philippine fishermen from 
pursuing their livelihoods by interfering with traditional fishing 
activities at Scarborough Shoal; 
(11) China has violated its obligations under the Convention to 
protect and preserve the marine environment at Scarborough 
Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross 
Reef, Gaven Reef, Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef and Subi Reef; 
(12) China’s occupation of and construction activities on Mischief 
Reef: 
(a) Violate the provisions of the Convention concerning 
artificial islands, installations and structures; 
(b) Violate China’s duties to protect and preserve the marine 
environment under the Convention; and 
(c) Constitute unlawful acts of attempted appropriation in 
violation of the Convention; 
(13) China has breached its obligations under the Convention by 
operating its law enforcement vessels in a dangerous manner 
causing serious risk of collision with Philippine vessels 
navigating in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal; 
(14) Since the commencement of this arbitration in January 2013, 
China has unlawfully aggravated and extended the dispute by, 
and among other things: 
(a) Interfering with the Philippines’ rights of navigation in the 
waters at, and adjacent to, Second Thomas Shoal; 
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(b) Preventing the rotation and resupply of Philippine personnel 
stationed at Second Thomas Shoal; 
(c) Endangering the health and well-being of Philippine 
personnel stationed at Second Thomas Shoal; and 
(d) Conducting dredging, artificial island-building, and 
construction activities at Mischief Reef, Cuarteron Reef, 
Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef 
and Subi Reef; and, 
(15) China shall respect the rights and freedoms of the Philippines 
under the Convention, shall comply with its duties under the 
Convention including those relevant to the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment in the South China Sea, 
and shall exercise its rights and freedoms in the South China 
Sea with due regard to those of the Philippines under the 
Convention.43 
B. Preliminary Matters of Jurisdiction Before the Tribunal 
Throughout the proceedings, the Tribunal took a number of steps to 
satisfy whether it had jurisdiction and whether the Philippines’ claims 
were “well founded in fact and law.”44 The Tribunal was led to infer, 
through informal statements, that China objected to defer to the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction.45 The Tribunal noted in its Award on 
Jurisdiction, that UNCLOS does not allow parties to the treaty to 
excuse themselves from the provisions that detail dispute resolution. 
Therefore, because both the Philippines and China are parties to 
UNCLOS, they must submit to Tribunal dispute resolution processes.46 
The Tribunal held that China’s non-participation does not deprive the 
Tribunal of jurisdiction and that the Tribunal had been properly 
established pursuant to the provisions of Annex VII to UNCLOS, 
which includes a procedure to form a tribunal even in the absence of 
one party.47 The Tribunal rejected the arguments set out in “China’s 
Position Paper,” in which China claimed that the parties’ dispute is 
actually about territorial sovereignty and maritime boundary 
delimitation, and that these issues cannot be addressed by the 
Tribunal.48 The Tribunal ultimately resolved that each of the 
 
43 Award, supra note 1, ¶ 112. 
44 Press Release, supra note 42, at 4. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 6. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 6. 
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Philippines’ submissions concerned a matter that could be addressed 
by UNCLOS.49 
The Tribunal’s Award on Jurisdiction held that it had jurisdiction 
over seven of the matters raised in the Philippines’ submissions and 
reserved the issue of its jurisdiction with respect to seven other 
submissions for decision together with the merits.50 Subsequently, the 
Tribunal held that it had jurisdiction over all submissions when 
deciding on the merits.51 Because the submissions did not involve 
issues of sovereignty over land territory, the Tribunal had jurisdiction 
to rule on all of the submissions put forth by the Philippines and the 
Award revolved around whether China’s claim to sovereignty over 
much of the South China Sea was compatible with UNCLOS.52 
C. China’s Nine-Dash Line and Historic Claims 
China’s claim to historic rights within the nine-dash line, which 
overlaps with the EEZ of the Philippines, was the major reason the 
Philippines instituted proceedings and was the focus of the Philippines’ 
submissions 1 and 2. Therefore, it was a major victory for the 
Philippines when the Tribunal ruled that, to the extent China claimed 
historic rights to resources in the waters inside its nine-dash line, such 
rights were forfeited when it ratified UNCLOS, if those waters are now 
within the EEZs of other coastal states.53 The Tribunal emphasized that 
the underlying rationale of UNCLOS was to give resources in EEZs to 
coastal states. Correspondingly, states with only a limited 
governmental presence on a small maritime feature would not have the 
same entitlements as coastal states.54 The Tribunal noted that the 
drafters of UNCLOS had explicitly rejected proposals for recognizing 
the historic rights of one state in another’s EEZ.55 
 
49 Id. at 7. 
50 Matthew Koh, Permanent Court of Arbitration Tribunal Issues Landmark 
Interpretation of UNCLOS in Philippines v China Arbitration, KLUWER ARBITRATION 
BLOG (Aug. 14, 2016), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/08/14/permanent-court-of   -
arbitration-tribunal-issues-landmark-interpretation-of-unclos-in-philippines-v-china-
arbitration/. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 See Award, supra note 1, ¶ 217. 
54 Id. ¶¶ 517−19. 
55 Id. ¶ 243. 
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Although the Tribunal found that China’s claim to historic rights in 
the nine-dash line was not compatible with UNCLOS, it did not rule 
that the nine-dash line per se is illegal or invalid. 
The nine-dash line’s legitimacy remains in relation to China’s 
sovereignty over specific islands in the South China Sea.56 Simply, 
China may attempt to claim sovereignty over maritime features within 
its nine-dash line that are islands as defined in Article 121 of 
UNCLOS‒–that is, “naturally formed areas of land surrounded by and 
above water at high tide.”57 This distinction bars any and all claims of 
sovereignty by China over maritime features other than islands, such 
as reefs or low-tide elevations (LTEs).58 
D. Status of Features in the South China Sea 
In submissions 3–7, the Philippines asserted disputes that arose 
between China and the Philippines on the status of, and entitlement to, 
maritime zones for the islands and reefs occupied by China. 
The first step taken by the Tribunal was a technical evaluation to 
determine which, if any, of the maritime features claimed by China 
were above high tide. Under Articles 13 and 121 of UNCLOS, 
maritime features that sustain land mass above the water while at high 
tide are entitled to a twelve nautical mile territorial sea, while features 
below high tide have no claim to rights under maritime zones.59 
Because UNCLOS classifies features on their natural condition, it 
required the Tribunal to investigate many of the reefs’ recent 
modifications by land reclamation and construction.60 An expert 
hydrographer evaluated the technical evidence and referenced 
historical surveys to determine the features’ natural condition.61 “The 
Tribunal ultimately agreed with the Philippines that Scarborough 
Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef are high-
tide features, while Subi Reef, Hughes Reef, Mischief Reef, and 
Second Thomas Shoal were submerged at high tide in their natural 
 
56 Robert Beckman, Tribunal Ruling a Game Changer, THE STRAITS TIMES (July 14, 
2016), http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/tribunal-ruling-a-game-changer-south-china    -
sea [hereinafter Beckman, Tribunal Ruling]. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Press Release, supra note 42, at 9. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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condition.”62 These LTEs are not entitled to maritime zones of their 
own and cannot be the subject of a sovereignty claim unless they are 
within twelve nautical miles of an island.63 
The Tribunal then considered whether any of the maritime features 
China claimed could generate an entitlement to maritime zones beyond 
twelve nautical miles. In other words, the Tribunal considered if any of 
the features claimed by China are islands that China could then use to 
claim sovereignty over the surrounding LTEs. The Philippines 
admitted that several of the reefs occupied by China were islands (as 
defined in Article 121 of UNCLOS) because they were naturally 
formed areas of land surrounded by and above water at high tide.64 
Under Article 121 of UNCLOS, islands generate an entitlement to an 
EEZ of 200 nautical miles and to a continental shelf. However, “[r]ocks 
which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own 
shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”65 The 
Tribunal held that a feature is not a rock if, objectively, in its natural 
condition, it can sustain either a stable community of people or an 
economic activity that is not dependent on outside resources or is not 
purely extractive in nature.66 On this basis, the Tribunal concluded that 
all the high-tide features in the Spratlys are rocks; these include 
Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Itu Aba 
Island.67 Therefore, each feature only has a twelve mile territorial sea 
and not an EEZ. In so concluding, the Tribunal noted that modern 
habitations on many of these features, being dependent on outside 
resources, do not constitute evidence of whether they can sustain 
human habitation or economic activity in their natural condition.68 
Temporary occupation of the features in the past also did not amount 
to habitation by stable communities; all historical economic activity 
had been purely extractive.69 In fact, the Tribunal presumed that if a 
feature has never hosted a stable community, “the most reasonable 
conclusion would be that the natural conditions are simply too difficult 
 
62 Id. 
63 UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 13(2). 
64 Award, supra note 1, ¶ 426. 
65 UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 121. 
66 Award, supra note 1, ¶¶ 504−05. 
67 Id. ¶¶ 643−44. 
68 Id. ¶ 578. 
69 Id. ¶ 624. 
HEBERT (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2018  12:31 PM 
2018] The South China Sea Arbitration Award and Its  303 
Widespread Implications 
for such a community to form and that the feature is not capable of 
sustaining such habitation.”70 
The Tribunal ruled that Mischief Reef is a LTE, not an island, 
located within the EEZ of the Philippines. This ruling means that the 
Philippines has jurisdiction and control over Mischief Reef and may 
exercise its exclusive right to authorize and regulate the construction, 
operation, and use of installations and structures on the reef.71 
Consequently, the Tribunal ruled that the installations and structures 
that China built on Mischief Reef are legally under the jurisdiction and 
control of the Philippines.72 In addition, nations such as the United 
States and Australia may extend their freedom of navigation and 
overflight operations to within twelve nautical miles of Mischief Reef 
since the Mischief Reef does not generate a territorial sea. These 
operations by foreign countries could lead to tense engagements with 
Chinese military vessels and aircrafts. 
The Tribunal’s decision that all of the Spratly Islands are rocks, and 
are entitled to no more than a twelve nautical mile territorial sea, 
establishes no areas of overlapping EEZ claims between the Philippines 
and China. “Consequently, the Philippines has the exclusive right to 
develop the oil and gas resources in Reed Bank, the area off its coast 
with the greatest potential for hydrocarbon resources.”73 China 
hindered the exploitation of this area because it claimed a right to the 
resources, as the area was within its nine-dash line. Under this decision, 
the EEZs of Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia are protected 
because China (with no historic rights to resources in their EEZs and 
none of the disputed islands entitled to an EEZ of its own) “has no legal 
basis under UNCLOS to claim that it has a right to share the fishing or 
hydrocarbon resources in [these] EEZs.”74 
E. Chinese Activities in the South China Sea 
Once the features in dispute were clearly defined, and the 
appropriate maritime zones established, the Tribunal could address 
submissions 8–13. These submissions concerned the lawfulness under 
UNCLOS of various Chinese actions in the South China Sea. Having 
 
70 Id. ¶ 549. 
71 See UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 56. 
72 Award, supra note 1, ¶ 647. 
73 Beckman, supra note 56. 
74 Id. 
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found that Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, and Reed Bank are 
LTEs, form part of the Philippines’s EEZ and continental shelf, and are 
not overlapped by any possible entitlement of China, the Tribunal 
concluded that UNCLOS clearly allocates sovereign rights to the 
Philippines with respect to sea areas in its EEZ.75 
The Tribunal found as a matter of fact that China (a) had interfered 
with Philippine petroleum exploration at Reed Bank; (b) [had been] 
purported to prohibit fishing by Philippine vessels within the 
Philippines’ [EEZ]; (c) protected and failed to prevent Chinese 
fishermen from fishing within the Philippines’ [EEZ] at Mischief 
Reef and Second Thomas Shoal; and (d) constructed installations and 
artificial islands at Mischief Reef without the authorization of the 
Philippines. The Tribunal therefore concluded that China violated the 
Philippines’ sovereign rights with respect to its [EEZ] and 
continental shelf.76 
Interestingly, the Tribunal held that both China and the Philippines 
had historic rights in the territorial sea around Scarborough Shoal.77 
Therefore, China violated its duty to respect the historic rights of the 
Philippines when it prevented Philippine fishermen from accessing the 
Shoal.78 Furthermore, China also breached its obligations under 
UNCLOS on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at 
Sea 1972 when its vessels created a serious risk of collision with 
Philippine vessels by preventing Philippine vessels from entering the 
Shoal.79 The Tribunal also held that China’s land reclamation and 
construction of artificial islands in the Spratlys, and failure to prevent 
Chinese fishermen from harvesting endangered sea life, breached its 
obligations under Articles 192 and 194 of UNCLOS to preserve and 
protect the marine environment.80 
F. China’s Aggravation or Extension of the Dispute 
The Philippines added submission 14 after the initial arbitration 
process commenced. The Philippines claimed that China had 
unlawfully aggravated and extended the dispute. The Tribunal recalled 
that a duty exists for parties engaged in a dispute settlement procedure 
to refrain from aggravating or extending the disputes at issue during the 
 
75 Press Release, supra note 42, at 10. 
76 Id. 
77 Award, supra note 1, ¶ 805. 
78 Id. ¶ 812. 
79 Id. ¶ 1109. 
80 Id. ¶¶ 991−92. 
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pending status of the settlement process.81 The Tribunal held China’s 
activities, such as constructing a large artificial island on Mischief Reef 
and destroying evidence of the natural condition of the features, 
aggravated and extended the dispute.82 
G. The Parties’ Future Conduct 
In respect to submission 15, “the Tribunal noted that both the 
Philippines and China have repeatedly accepted that [UNCLOS] and 
general obligations of good faith define and regulate their conduct.”83 
The Tribunal surmised that neither China nor the Philippines intended 
to infringe on each other’s legal rights, but that this dispute arose over 
a fundamental difference in interpreting and understanding their 
respective rights under UNCLOS in the South China Sea.84 
The Tribunal then ended by reiterating, “Article 11 of Annex VII 
provides that the ‘award . . . shall be complied with by the parties to the 
dispute,’” implying that the Tribunal expects both parties to abide by 
the Award.85 
IV 
CHINA’S COMPLIANCE WITH THE AWARD 
In reaction to the Tribunal’s ruling, China immediately released two 
statements: (1) a notably subdued government statement that 
reaffirmed China’s “territorial sovereignty and maritime rights” in the 
South China Sea and expressed its desire to “resolve the relevant 
disputes peacefully” without making explicit reference to either the 
Philippines or the arbitration proceedings,86 and (2) a much more 
hardline statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declaring that 
the ruling is “null and void and has no binding force.”87 China’s state-
 
81 Press Release, supra note 42, at 11. 
82 Award, supra note 1, ¶ 1181. 
83 Press Release, supra note 42, at 11. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Government of China, Statement on China’s Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime 
Rights and Interests in the South China Sea (July 12, 2016), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn 
/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1379493.shtml. 
87 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the People’s Republic of China on the Award of 12 July 2016 of the Arbitral Tribunal in the 
South China Sea Arbitration Established at the Request of the Republic of the Philippines 
(July 12, 2016), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1379492 .shtml. 
HEBERT (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2018  12:31 PM 
306 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 19, 289 
affiliated press simultaneously released a slew of articles condemning 
the ruling.88 
Although China has seemed to assert its intention to ignore the 
Award, there are factors that may permit China to become partially, if 
not completely, compliant in the future.89 China’s interactions with 
neighboring states in the South China Sea are a more appropriate 
determination of whether China intends to comply with the Award.90 
China is currently clearly violating four of the Tribunal’s rulings and is 
fully compliant with one;91 “it is uncertain whether China is in 
compliance with the rest of the Tribunal’s rulings.”92 “Two of China’s 
violations of the [A]ward stem from activity related to its [continued] 
presence on an artificial island at Mischief Reef, which the . . . 
[T]ribunal found was an unlawful occupation and constitutes 
interference with Philippines’ rights to an . . . [EEZ] and continental 
shelf.”93 Two more examples of non-compliance include “China’s 
continuing refusal to allow Filipino fishermen to return to their 
traditional fishing grounds around Scarborough Shoal and its broader 
interference with Filipino fishermen within the Philippines’ EEZ.”94 
The only example of full compliance is China’s agreement that 
“disputes in the South China Sea should be resolved on the basis of 
international law, including UNCLOS.”95 Overall, China is neither 
clearly in compliance nor clearly in violation with most of the 
Tribunal’s award.96 Since the Award’s issuance in July of 2016, China 
has not explicitly violated even the Tribunal’s most well-known 
ruling—against China’s nine-dash line claim.97 
 
88 See generally, President Xi Says China Rejects Any Proposition, Action Based on S. 
China Sea Arbitration Award, XINHUA (July 12, 2016, 8:03 PM), http://en.people.cn/n3 
/2016/0712/c90883-9085068.html; Inherently Biased and Unjust ‘Piece of Paper, CHINA 
DAILY (July 12, 2016), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2016-07/12/content_26063 
420.htm; and Wang Xiaohui, S. China Sea Arbitration: A US-led Conspiracy behind the 
farce, PEOPLE’S DAILY (July 12, 2016), http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0712/c90000-90850 
51.html. 
89 Julian Ku & Chris Mirasola, Tracking China’s Compliance with the South China Sea 
Arbitral Award, LAWFARE (Oct. 3, 2016, 2:39 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com 
/tracking-chinas-compliance-south-china-sea-arbitral-award. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
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On October 18, 2016, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte traveled 
to Beijing to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping.98 The respective 
parties discussed many matters of state including concessions to bring 
China further into compliance with the Tribunal’s award. First, the 
parties “consider[ed] allowing Filipino fishermen conditional access to 
waters in and around Scarborough Shoal.”99 Second, officials began the 
process of finalizing a deal on joint oil and natural gas exploration near 
Reed Bank in the South China Sea that would be controlled by the 
Philippines.100 Third, a Memorandum of Understanding was released 
outlining Chinese and Philippine trade deals ranging from 
infrastructure to trade and tourism worth $13.5 billion.101 An additional 
memo established procedures for bilateral defense cooperation and 
joint communication between the countries’ respective Coast 
Guards.102 Finally, “Presidents Xi and Duterte agreed to begin bilateral 
negotiations to resolve their maritime disputes, [where they] ‘will meet 
regularly on current and other issues of concern to either side of the 
South China Sea.’”103 
Although China is currently working toward compliance with the 
Award and is engaged in bilateral negotiations with the Philippines, it 
could decide to resume its pursuit of sovereign domain over the nine-
dash line. Months after the Award, it is still unclear whether or how the 
Award will prompt a change in China’s behavior in the short or long 
term. It can reasonably be expected that China will not depart from the 
position it has held since 2013; it will not acknowledge the authority of 
the arbitral tribunal or abide by the ruling.104 In this event, several 
responses are possible. Some likely responses are discussed below. 
China could pursue a strategy of “show the flag,” where the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), the Chinese Coast Guard, or its maritime 
militia conduct patrols or staged exercises in its claimed waters.105 This 
strategy would symbolically reinforce China’s perceived claim through 
 
98 Chris Mirasola, Water Wars: Mr. Duterte Goes to Beijing, LAWFARE (Oct. 21, 2016, 
9:05 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/water-wars-mr-duterte-goes-beijing. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Greg Poling, The South China Sea Arbitration: Anticipating Next Moves and 
Countermoves, YOUTUBE (June 20, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6pNnIMk 
TimU. 
105 Campbell & Salidjanova, supra note 5, at 4. 
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continued presence and deterrence of foreign vessels in the region. 
Increased harassment or intimidation of Philippine or other vessels by 
either the Chinese Coast Guard or the maritime militia, a frequent 
occurrence in recent years, is also possible.106 
The PLA could also respond by deploying fighter jets or other 
advanced military assets to the Spratly Islands (which would violate 
China’s pledge not to “militarize” the area).107 
There is the potential for China to renew or expand its push in the 
commercial exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons and other 
minerals in the disputed waters.108 China demonstrated its willingness 
to escalate tensions by twice moving an oil rig into waters near the 
Paracel Islands—an area also claimed by Vietnam—despite Vietnam’s 
protests.109 China also reportedly approved plans for a mobile deep-sea 
platform to explore for minerals in the South China Sea.110 
China might employ overt or indirect economic sanctions against the 
Philippines, as it did when it restricted Philippine banana imports and 
restricted Chinese travel to the Philippines during the Scarborough 
Shoal crisis in 2012.111 
China has thus far refrained from conducting land reclamation at 
Scarborough Shoal, likely due to intense U.S. pressure.112 However, 
 
106 See generally Todd Crowell, A Coast Guard Arms Race, REAL CLEAR DEFENSE (May 
23, 2016), http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/05/23/a_coast_guard_arms_race 
_109386.html; Andrew S. Erickson & Conor M. Kennedy, China’s Maritime Militia, CNA 
3 (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.andrewerickson.com/2016/03/chinas-maritime-militia-our-
most-extensive-detailed-analysis-yet/. 
107 Poling, supra note 104. 
108 Campbell & Salidjanova, supra note 5, at 4. 
109 Ben Blanchard, China Rebuffs Vietnam Criticism of Oil Rig Move, REUTERS (Apr. 8, 
2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-china-vietnam-idUSKCN0X50 
WU. 
110 David Tweed & Keith Zhai, China Is Planning a Massive Sea Lab 10,000 Feet 
Underwater, BLOOMBERG (June 7, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016     
-06-07/china-pushes-plan-for-oceanic-space-station-in-south-china-sea. 
111 See Andrew Higgins, In Philippines, Banana Growers Feel Effect of South China Sea 
Dispute, WASH. POST (June 10, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia 
_pacific/in-philippines-banana-growers-feel-effect-of-south-china-sea-dispute/2012/06/10 
/gJQA47WVTV_story.html; Island Spat: China Suspends Philippine Travel, CNN (May 
10, 2012), http://travel.cnn.com/shanghai/life/china-travel-suspension-437031/. 
112 See Demetri Sevastopulo, Geoff Dyer, & Tom Mitchell, Obama Forced Xi to Back 
Down Over South China Sea Dispute, FINANCIAL TIMES (July 12, 2016), http://www.ft 
.com/cms/s/0/c63264a4-47f1-11e6-8d68-72e9211e86ab.html#axzz4ECRJFKMu; Zack 
Cooper & Jake Douglas, Successful Signaling at Scarborough Shoal?, WAR ON THE ROCKS 
(May 2, 2016), http://warontherocks.com/2016/05/successful-signaling-at-scarborough-
shoal/. 
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China may perceive it to be a way to expand its physical presence in its 
claimed waters after being dealt a blow to its legal position. Though the 
Tribunal ruled that Scarborough Shoal was a rock (rather than an island 
or LTE), it did not determine whether China or the Philippines has 
sovereignty over the feature. Further, the Tribunal did not deem 
Chinese fishing activities near Scarborough Shoal unlawful.113 China 
could feasibly use this part of the Award as a justification for 
reclamation for the purposes of facilitating fishing activities in the area. 
Should China develop Scarborough Shoal in the way it developed the 
other reclaimed features in the Spratly Island chain, it could 
significantly enhance China’s military presence in the South China Sea 
and establish a military outpost unprecedentedly close to the 
Philippines. This would effectively create a “strategic triangle” of 
occupied islands (the Paracel Islands, Scarborough Shoal, and the 
Spratly Islands) with the ability to host civilian and military 
infrastructure.114 
Since China established an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) 
in the East China Sea in 2013, several Chinese officials have suggested 
that China might create a second zone in the South China Sea.115 
Though it is unclear whether the PLA has the capabilities in place to 
enforce an ADIZ in the South China Sea, it is possible China would 
establish one anyway for geopolitical, rather than operational, 
reasons.116 In such a case, the ADIZ’s utility could largely be symbolic, 
signaling China’s resolve and rejection of the ruling.117 
In recent years, Chinese officials and state-affiliated media advanced 
an argument that China’s position on the South China Sea disputes are 
 
113 See generally Award, supra note 1, ¶¶ 805−13. 
114 Yoji Koda, Japan’s Perceptions of and Interests in the South China Sea, ASIA POLICY 
21 (Jan. 2016), http://nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=862. See also Cooper & 
Douglas, supra note 112. 
115 CHINA’S MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua 
Chunying’s Regular Press Conference (Jan. 4, 2016). See also Edward Wong, China Says 
It Could Set up Air Defense Zone in South China Sea, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/01/world/asia/china-says-it-could-set-up-air-defense-
zone-in-south-china-sea.html; China Has Right to Set Another Air Zone, Envoy Says, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.todayonline.com/chinaindia/china/china-
has-right-set-another-air-zone-envoy-says. 
116 Michael Pilger, ADIZ Update: Enforcement in the East China Sea, Prospects for the 
South China Sea, and Implications for the United States, U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND 
SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION 7 (Mar. 2, 2016), http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites 
/default/files/Research/ADIZ%20Update_0.pdf. 
117 Campbell & Salidjanova, supra note 5, at 5. 
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fully in line with international law, and that the Tribunal’s proceedings 
constitute a violation, or are outside the jurisdiction, of UNCLOS.118 
As the ruling drew near, Chinese diplomats reportedly suggested to 
their counterparts in Southeast Asia that China was considering 
withdrawing from UNCLOS if the ruling was unfavorable to China.119 
However, taking this step does little to advance China’s actual interests 
and, more likely, undermines those interests.120 
V 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE AWARD 
The Award is final and binding on both China and the Philippines.121 
Hopefully China, despite its initial reactions, will comply voluntarily. 
Voluntary adherence to the Award’s guidelines would be an 
opportunity for China to repair any reputational damage resulting from 
its non-participation in the arbitration. The Award could be a starting 
point for improved diplomatic relations between the states surrounding 
the South China Sea. “One of the most significant implications of the 
Award is that it may encourage States to compromise on their 
sovereignty claims in the South China Sea” and further joint 
development in the region.122 Joint development may be the most 
practical and peaceful way for states to exploit resources in this 
contentious region. China and the Philippines are already exploring the 
benefits of joint development through their continued negotiations for 
a deal on joint oil and natural gas exploration near Reed Bank.123 
However, it should be noted that rulings regarding UNCLOS must be 
enforced by individual member states; the lack of a formal enforcement 
 
118 Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of 
Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, 
CHINA’S MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa 
_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml. 
119 Kyodo, Beijing Indicates it May Exit U.N. Sea Convention if South China Sea Ruling 
Disappoints, JAPAN TIMES (June 21, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/06/21 
/national/politics-diplomacy/beijing-indicates-may-exit-u-n-sea-convention-south-china-
sea-ruling-disappoints/#.V2qFYbsrLRZ. 
120 Tara Davenport, Why China Shouldn’t Denounce UNCLOS, THE DIPLOMAT (Mar. 
24, 2016), http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/why-china-shouldnt-denounce-unclos/. 
121 UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 296. 
122 Koh, supra note 50. 
123 Mirasola, supra note 98. 
HEBERT (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2018  12:31 PM 
2018] The South China Sea Arbitration Award and Its  311 
Widespread Implications 
regime means that there is no legal process of enforcing China’s 
compliance with the Award.124 
If the Award fails to alter China’s behavior in the long term, it would 
signal to the rest of the world that adherence to international law is 
optional. Optional adherence would undermine the viability of 
international maritime law as a tool to ensure the peaceful, stable, and 
lawful use of the seas.125 China’s current response to the Award, while 
creating significant long-term consequences in international maritime 
law, also directly contradicts the United States’ oft-stated goal of 
preserving peace in the Asia Pacific through the promotion of a “rules-
based order.”126 Despite China’s response, the states bordering the 
South China Sea can be expected to strongly support the Award as its 
reasoning applies equally to their EEZ claims. They will strongly 
oppose any attempt by China to assert a right to the natural resources 
within their EEZs on the basis that it has historic rights within the nine-
dash line. China’s compliance with the Tribunal’s Award 
notwithstanding, other countries, particularly Vietnam, that have 
competing maritime claims with China may be encouraged by the 
Tribunal ruling to initiate their own cases against China.127 Future 
actions would be a positive development as they would provide some 
authoritative clarity on the other competing natural resource claims in 
the region, and could be a useful way to apply additional pressure on 
China to voluntarily comply with the Award’s guidelines.128 
No matter China’s actions, the Award confirms the compulsory 
nature of the UNCLOS dispute resolution mechanism and reinforces 
the rule of law in the oceans. The value of the Philippines/China arbitral 
 
124 International Institutions and Global Governance, The Global Oceans Regime, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (June 19, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/oceans/global-
oceans-regime/p21035. 
125 Justin Nankivell, Navigating Unsettled Waters: Introducing the Maritime Awareness 
Project, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.you 
tube.com/watch?v=BgoECozdMYI. 
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Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016 95 (Apr. 26, 2016), 
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power
%20Report.pdf; U.S. Department of Defense, Asia Pacific Maritime Security Strategy 2 
(Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Mari 
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127 Manuel Mogato, Vietnam PM says Considering Legal Action against China over 
Disputed Waters, REUTERS (May 22, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-
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proceedings goes beyond China’s compliance and is important for 
articulating the significance of the international dispute settlement 
system to global peace and security. Another value of the Tribunal’s 
ruling is the clarification of certain principles in UNCLOS that have 
been buried in uncertainty, or have been subject to conflicting 
interpretations.129 For example, one of the catalysts for heightened 
tensions in the South China Sea is the lack of a clear definition of an 
island capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life of its 
own under Article 121 (3).130 Previous international courts and 
tribunals managed to avoid pronouncing definitively on this issue, but 
now that the Award has been issued, there are clear standards that states 
can use to determine whether a maritime feature is an “island” or a 
“rock” as defined by UNCLOS. And while most law of the sea experts 
definitively agree that historic rights cannot be recognized in the EEZ, 
China instigated friction in the South China Sea by relying on 
UNCLOS’s lack of an express condemnation of historic rights to 
validate its claims.131 The definitive ruling on these and other issues 
from the Tribunal provide authoritative, independent guidance on 
critical aspects of law of the sea that have for years gone unanswered 
by UNCLOS.132 The Tribunal’s interpretation of UNCLOS in its 
Award enhances the legitimacy of both the Convention and its dispute 
resolution system in the realm of international law by defining how the 
functional application of the law of the sea relates to member states.133 
By articulating standards and clarifying uncertainties found in 
UNCLOS, the Tribunal is repositioning UNCLOS to once again be the 
definitive law of the sea.134 
CONCLUSION 
The issuance of the Award represented a resounding win for the 
Philippines, but by no means does it put to rest the disputes or the 
tensions in the South China Sea. The arbitration was never going to 
resolve issues of sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea, 
and combined with the Tribunal’s lack of enforcement capability in the 
 
129 Tara Davenport, Why the South China Sea Arbitration Case Matters (Even if China 
Ignores It), THE DIPLOMAT (July 08, 2016), http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/why-the-
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face of an openly hostile China, there remains many unanswered 
questions as to how the disputes in the South China Sea move forward. 
However, the Tribunal’s main objective was to issue a final and binding 
decision on a legal dispute on the interpretation and application of 
UNCLOS. By compelling China to arbitrate, the Philippines took an 
essential step that clarified many of the issues that have been obstacles 
for any long-lasting agreement in the South China Sea. The award not 
only clarified in several ways how UNCLOS applies to the complex 
disputes in the South China Sea, but the reasoning in this case will 
likely impact the development of a rules-based order for the oceans, 
whether or not it is strictly complied with by the parties in the case. As 
an authoritative interpretation of UNLCOS by eminent law of the sea 
experts, the Award will be studied by law students and government 
legal advisers for years to come. 
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